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Abstract  
In Europe over the last two decades, marketization has become an important policy option in 
elderly care. Comparative studies predominantly adopt an institutional perspective and analyse 
the politics and policies of marketization. This analysis takes a step back and examines the 
fundamental ideas underpinning the policies of marketization, using the ‘What’s the problem’ 
approach by Carol Bacchi. The central question is how the market was discursively framed as the 
solution to the perceived problems of three different systems of elderly care, and how such 
processes are similar or different across the three countries. The analysis includes two extreme 
types of elderly care systems, the Nordic public systems in Denmark and Finland and the 
Southern European family based model in Italy. Empirically, the analysis offers interesting 
insights into processes of constructing and legitimating markets at the level of discourse; this 
occurs by defining specific problem representations, underlying assumptions and silences. In all 
three countries, marketization is presented as a solution which builds on rather than challenges 
dominant ideas of care. Conceptually, in addition to its institutions, it is crucial to understand the 
ideas behind the marketization of elderly care. Ideas emerge as a key leverage for making 
policies and practices of marketization acceptable and which decision makers and other 
influential political/societal actors use in policy and public debates. The importance of ideas is 
further underlined by the fact they do not necessarily relate to the institutions of elderly care 
systems in a linear way.  
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Introduction 
 
Marketization broadly describes policies, which use markets and market mechanisms in the 
provision of welfare services (Savas 1987). In Europe over the last two decades, marketization 
has become an important policy option in public sector reforms and this also applies to elderly 
care (XXX 2008; Brennan et al. 2012; Meagher and Szebehely 2013). Markets in elderly care 
can be understood as practices that construct care as commodity and the individual in need as a 
consumer. The existence of markets often also coincides with the increased presence of for-profit 
providers in the delivery of care services (Anttonen & Häikiö 2011). Marketization has included 
both supply and demand side mechanisms to pave the way to markets. Quasi-markets are a 
prominent supply side mechanism, and, for example in England, differ from conventional 
markets in that some providers do not make any profit or in that purchasing power is expressed 
in terms of earmarked budgets to buy certain goods and services (Le Grand 1991). Demand-side 
marketization generally occurs through cash-for care programs, by which funds are allocated 
directly to users in form of vouchers or non-earmarked cash. Voucher systems have been 
introduced in France, the Netherlands and some Nordic countries, where public authorities allow 
individuals to choose services from a range of suppliers and up to a certain monetary value. 
Other countries, such as Austria, Germany and Italy, have nationwide public, non-earmarked 
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cash-for-care schemes, where public authorities offer a cash sum in lieu of directly provided 
services. As the use of cash is not tied to any specific conditions, this often leads to the 
emergence of informal care markets; these function entirely or partly outside formal rules and 
allow irregular employment and tax evasion.  
 
Comparative studies of marketization in elderly care predominantly adopt an institutional 
perspective and analyse the politics and policies of marketization in order to explain this variety 
of market mechanisms and institutional settings. The first type of study examines how 
institutional contexts shape the interests and resources of actors in the policy process and by 
extension the substance of policies (for example Eichler and Pfau-Effinger 2009; XXX 2013). 
The second type of study is concerned with how individual mechanisms of marketization 
develop and what effects they have in different country specific contexts (for example Da Roit 
and Le Bihan 2011; Tynkkynen et al. 2012). What is often missing is how ideas have shaped 
policy change in elderly care; this is important as normative assumptions play a crucial role in 
public discourse on social policy (Béland 2005). Ideas are about what is or what ought to be and 
appeal to values and appropriateness; they are not fixed entities, but constantly in the making and 
contested (Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014: 176). This study, therefore, takes a step back and 
examines the fundamental ideas underpinning the politics and policies of marketization, using 
the ‘What’s the problem’ approach developed by Carol Bacchi (1999; 2009). The focus is on 
assumptions and tacit knowledge underlying policy changes aimed at introducing market 
mechanisms in elderly care. This is particularly interesting for those countries in Europe, which, 
in contrast to most Continental European countries, did not see any radical institutional changes 
in the last two decades, but where marketization nevertheless occurred. The central question is 
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how the market was discursively framed as the solution to the perceived problems of the existing 
system of elderly care. Discourse refers to the practice of the social construction of knowledge 
that takes place in different arenas, from everyday conversations to the processes of formulating 
policies (see Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014: 174).  
 
We choose two extreme types of elderly care systems, the Nordic public systems in Denmark 
and Finland and the Southern European family based model in Italy. The former have developed 
a comprehensive public system of elderly care, while Italy has a familialist care model with very 
limited state responsibility (Costa 2013). In the Nordic countries, the pressure for new policy 
solutions came from financial concerns over ageing and economic austerity, while in Italy this 
was combined with demand pressures reflecting the weakening of the traditional family-based 
system. According to recent research (Bettio and Verashchagina 2012), in Southern European 
countries the introduction of care markets has occurred in similar ways, while in Nordic 
countries a differentiation of elderly care systems has emerged; the latter requires including more 
than one national case.  
 
In the ensuing process of squaring the circle of fitting the market into a system dominated by the 
public provision and the family respectively, two specific discursive processes are activated: 
construction (How is the market constructed politically?) and legitimisation (How is the market 
thought of? What problems is the market supposed to address and how?). Our specific research 
questions can be formulated as follows: What kind of discursive processes of constructing and 
legitimising markets have occurred in Denmark, Finland and Italy? In what ways are these 
processes similar or different across countries?   
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While the overall understanding of marketization is similar across countries (Hood 1991), the 
more specific ideas about the market vary, as reflected in different ways to construct and 
legitimize markets. This makes an important contribution to existing studies on the marketization 
of elderly care, notably that not only the institutions differ but also the underlying ideas differ 
and that there is not necessarily a linear relationship between ideas and institutions. The latter is 
highlighted by including Denmark and Finland as two elderly care systems based on public 
provision. 
 
Studying problem representations, underlying assumptions and silences in policies  
 
Care for the elderly is a societal question that is addressed in multiplicity of ways in modern 
societies. However, social and political problems are not just existing ‘out there’, but are created 
in processes of policy making and wider political struggles in society (see Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; Edelmann 1988; Schramm 1995). Building on this, Bacchi (1999; 2009) has developed a 
more concrete approach to discursive policy analysis. Instead of taking the existence of problems 
for granted (Bacchi 2009: ix), she adopts a ‘problem’ questioning approach. The ‘What’s the 
problem represented to be’ (WPR) analysis turns the starting point upside down and makes the 
problem defined by politicians and the media the object of investigation. This is done based on 
six questions, which range from asking about what problems are represented in a specific policy, 
with what underlying assumptions and implicit silences, to asking about how representations 
emerge, are disseminated and shape policy effects. 
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With these questions, Bacchi provides a detailed yet manageable approach to analysing any 
policy reform, including elderly care. Her approach is based on an understanding of discourse as 
forms of knowledge that limit ’what is it possible to think, write or speak about’ (Bacchi 2009: 
35). This turns ‘What’s the problem’ into a critical approach that tries to understand how one 
particular representation of a problem has become pervasive and to identify the effects of such a 
representation. In this perspective, discourses are the processes through which problems are 
constructed, represented and legitimised, in this case in elderly care policy documents, whereas 
ideas account for the broader understandings of how the elderly care system should be reformed 
(Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014).  
 
We have focused on three questions to give ample space to the cross-country comparisons. We 
examine: a) the dominant lines of argument concerning the need and proposals for policy 
change; b) the rationalities and concepts involved in the representation of the problem; c) and the 
related unproblematic aspects (silences). As outlined in more detail below, we investigate the 
three questions in relation to the specific changes in the elderly care systems in Denmark, 
Finland and Italy.   
 
The first question is: ‘What’s the ”problem” represented to be?’ For example, if the suggested 
change is outsourcing in elderly care, it is important to identify the problem this change was 
supposed to solve. So the specific question becomes: What is/are the problem(s) marketization is 
represented to be an answer to?  
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The second question goes deeper into the discourse and looks at the presuppositions the problem 
representation is based upon. Presuppositions play an important role in creating meaning and 
naturalizing the problem representation. Such underlying assumptions can be particular 
rationalities, keywords and/or dichotomies that involve hierarchies of valorization (Bacchi 2009: 
6, 57–61), for example useful versus useless. What ways of arguing are used? What specific 
forms of knowledge does the argument draw upon? Are there any keywords used, for example 
‘elderly burden’ and if so, what is implied in their usage? Are there any dichotomies used in the 
lines of argument? If so, what are they? 
 
The third question is less straightforward, as it relates to what is not talked about. Here the focus 
is on what is left unproblematic and not questioned. Silencing emerges as a process that exists 
alongside the things said being a precondition of what is said (Foucault 1976: 27; XXX 2012a). 
Nevertheless, not everything can become visible (Law 2007: 600). As researchers, we can only 
get glimpses of the silencing by inquiring about the absent other side, for example, what happens 
to care workers when their employment changes from public to market-based services may not 
be mentioned in the political discourse about outsourcing. 
 
Methods and data 
 
In terms of country selection, our comparative research design follows the critical case logic, 
whereby the cases included are critical examples of the subject under study or whereby they have 
the potential to reveal something essential (see Yin 2011: 193), and includes Denmark, Finland 
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and Italy. The rationale for comparison is thus to shed light on the important role played by ideas 
in marketization processes in different national contexts.  
 
In contrast to Continental European countries, their elderly care systems did not have any 
paradigmatic reform in the last two decades; the three systems were also furthest from the 
market-based system of elderly care, with the state and the family respectively as the central for 
the provision of elderly care. They therefore offer especially challenging contexts for squaring 
the circle of fitting market mechanisms into the existing systems of elderly care. Under such 
circumstances, strategies of discursive construction and legitimisation will be particularly 
important. We include two Nordic countries to account for the emerging variation of the public 
systems of elderly care; more specifically, the range of mechanisms of marketization and the 
scope of their use is wider in Finland than in Denmark (Bertelsen and Rostgaard 2013; Karsio 
and Anttonen 2013).  
 
The case selection focuses on policies concerned with demand led marketization of elderly care, 
which has been one of the main arguments for marketization (Brennan et al. 2012). Demand led 
mechanisms, which give individual users purchasing power and choice in their care (Timonen et 
al. 2006; Meagher and Szebehely 2013), are present in all three countries, but with interesting 
variations. In Denmark and Finland, vouchers are the predominant instrument: following a needs 
assessment by the municipality, the elderly person may receive a voucher; s/he is then free to 
choose among the providers approved by the municipality, although the voucher is typically 
earmarked for a specific set of services (Rostgaard 2006; XXX 2012). In contrast, in Italy non-
earmarked cash-for-care payments prevail; they are granted by the national government without 
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restrictions for users on how the money is spent. This has offered a lever for the rising 
employment of migrant care workers, which has been further secured by legislation on migration 
(Da Roit and Le Bihan 2011). 
 
Across the three countries, the demand led mechanisms of marketization are embedded in very 
different contexts and this accounts for differences in the kind of material used in our analysis. In 
both Denmark and Finland, vouchers or free choice have been introduced as part of specific 
legislation. The analysis therefore mainly draws on official documents, including parliamentary 
debates and hearings, legislative texts and ministerial guidance, as well as other relevant policy 
documents. In Denmark this has been supplemented by newspaper articles to capture some of the 
silences of existing problem definitions. The Finnish data covers the period between 1994 to the 
present, as marketization expanded after the 1993 law that changed the system of state grants to 
municipalities responsible for organizing health and social care. The corresponding period for 
the data from Denmark is 1990 to 2003, from the early critique of elderly care to the introduction 
of the free choice legislation. In Italy, by contrast, there have been very few changes in 
legislation. The non-earmarked cash-for-are payment has existed since 1980 and it has largely 
expanded without any explicit design or public discussion (Costa 2013). Instead, the issue of the 
care market has been only debated within the broader and often highly heated public discussions 
about migration. The major change paving the way for the emergence of the care market 
happened in 2002, when a new legislation (law Bossi-Fini) established the yearly quotas for 
migrant care workers and the recurrent amnesties for illegal migrant care workers. This is also 
the starting point of our analysis, which draws on the political debates in parliament and the 
broader public debate as it occurs in the media at the time of key legislation on migration. We 
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carried out a content analysis (see Downe‐Wamboldt 1992) of the two most important national 
newspapers (Corriere della Sera [CdS] and Repubblica [R]) from 2002 to 2013. We found 6,239 
articles with reference to migrant care workers, cash-for-care or elder care, and made a selection 
based on the three-month period immediately before and after the most important political 
decisions (the yearly quotas and amnesties in 2002, 2008-2009 and 2012). The content analysis 
focused on widely debated issues, such as the representation of migrant care workers, their 
working conditions and legal status, the care needs of the elderly population and their families, 
and the inadequate state of long-term care policies.  
 
In summary, our analysis draws on material which captures as best as possible the formulations 
of ‘official truths’ around policies and developments that introduce or encourage the demand led 
marketization of elderly care in the three countries. Official truth is understood as the point of 
view presented in the official documents of the decision makers or as in Italy also in media 
discourse. Thus, our material is typically close to the legislation or equivalent processes, and our 
analysis centres around illustrating different discursive strategies based on key quotes from a 
cross-country perspective. In contrast, we are less interested in mapping out the positions of 
individual stakeholders and the detailed trajectories of how problem definitions came about. The 
theory led country and case selection ensures the comparability of the findings, as does the fact 
that we have subjected the data from each country case to the same three questions identified by 
Bacchi and outlined in more detail in the section on theory above. 
 
Contexts and development of demand led marketization  
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In order to better understand the problem representations which through discourses create and 
back up the demand led mechanisms of marketization, this section offers a short overview of the 
contexts and main developments of voucher or non-earmarked cash system in each country.  
 
Denmark 
In Denmark, vouchers introduced as part of ‘Free Choice’ (frit valg) legislation in 2003 are the 
main lever for demand led marketization (Højlund 2004; 2006). The legislation primarily allows 
citizen choice of service provider; it also extends the choice of the range of services provided. 
This is also coupled with supply based mechanisms and the legislation requires local authorities 
to act as purchasers and to contract services not only from public but also from private providers. 
Yet choice is combined with control. Users may only choose among the providers approved by 
the local authority and based on the services allocated by the local authority following the needs 
assessment. Users also have some choice concerning the precise services they receive, but this 
has to be approved by a care worker as professionally sound.  
 
Danish elderly care was subject to massive criticism in the mid 1990’s. It was argued, that the 
state was unable to control the cost of elderly care (Finansministeriet 1995); and that the existing 
public system of elderly care alone was incapable of meeting future needs, because of its 
inflexible and paternalistic nature (Andersen 1997). Marketization had to be made to fit with 
ongoing transformations of moving elderly care to home based settings and professionalizing of 
care givers (XXX 2000); and it had to be translated in the specific institutional context elderly 
care in Denmark with its focus on ‘equality’, a non-centralist state and a concern for users. The 
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notion of ‘self-determination’ helped to make the relevant connections (Ældrekommissionens 
delrapporter 1980‒82). 
 
Finland 
In Finland, a voucher is a tax-free fixed sum that the municipality grants to users eligible for 
municipal care services after needs testing. Users are allowed to choose the provider from a list 
approved by the municipality but do not have a choice of the substance of services. The voucher 
system came to Finland incrementally. In the second half of the 1990s, there were pilots in some 
municipalities and the extension of voucher system was part of government programs during the 
first decade of 2000 (for example Lipponen government program 1999). The first law came into 
force in 2004, when service vouchers were taken into use for home care. In 2009, the vouchers 
were extended to cover almost all social and health services (Law on social and health care 
vouchers 569/2009; Vuorenkoski 2009). In contrast to Denmark, vouchers do not cover all the 
costs for elderly care: care services may be more expensive when purchased with vouchers and 
users typically have to pay a deductible in addition to the user fees set by the law on social and 
health care service fees (Law on social and health care service fees in Finland 734/1992).  
 
In terms of broader political context, the marketization of elderly care has forerunners already in 
the beginning of the 1980s, where marketization became possible in principle but was strictly 
controlled. This changed in the early 1990s, when the grants from the national government to the 
municipalities came to reflect ex-ante calculations of needs. This was followed by legislation that 
gave municipalities the possibility to outsource service provision (Toikko 2012: 63). The 
economic depression in the beginning of 1990s and the push towards new public management 
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reforms by multinational organizations paved the way for the marketization of Finnish elder care 
(see Julkunen 2001; Alasuutari and Rasimus 2011). Marketization draws on a wide range of 
mechanisms in addition to vouchers, including: purchaser provider split, contracting out, 
competitive bidding and tax credit (Karsio and Anttonen 2013). 
 
Italy 
Over the last decade, the non-earmarked cash-for-care payment (Indennità di 
Accompagnamento) introduced in Italy in 1980 (Da Roit and Le Bihan 2011: 183) has 
contributed to a significant growth of a new care market. This has been further fostered by the 
availability of around 800,000 migrant care workers (Pasquinelli and Rusmini 2013). It is 
estimated that these care workers are present in 9 per cent of households with people aged 65 and 
over, mainly on a live-in basis (Gori 2012), and that almost one third are undeclared migrants 
(Pasquinelli and Rusmini 2013). Despite the absence of explicit policies, the influx of migrant 
care workers, together with scarce availability of public home and residential care services have 
de facto marketized elderly care. The frequent use of ex-post regularisation to legalize migrant 
workers, together with policies aiming at both limiting and regularizing the inflow of new 
migrants into the country, have further fuelled marketization. 
 
This process emerged in an unusual political context. Despite the significant growth in the 
number of immigrants, since the 2000s the Italian migratory regime has in fact been highly 
restrictive. The government mainly consisted of a coalition between the conservative party and 
the country’s most xenophobic party (Lega Nord). Electoral campaigns included strong populist 
and racist rhetoric against the illegal presence of migrants. Nevertheless, the population at large 
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has increasingly accepted the role of migrant care workers, notably as a crucial resource to 
compensate for the shrinking care capacity of family.  
 
Comparative analysis of marketization 
 
Problem representations 
The problem representations reflect the fact that the idea of markets needed to fit into elderly 
care systems dominated by public services and the family respectively. In Denmark and Finland, 
concerns about user responsiveness and especially the costs of public care services prevail, 
whereas in Italy the latter is combined with concerns about the declining care capacity of 
families. 
 
In Denmark, the problem representation was embedded in a critique of the existing welfare state 
dating from the early 1990s. In this view, the welfare state was old fashioned, ‘bureaucratic’ and 
‘paternalistic’ and thus unable to control costs and substance of the system of elderly care 
(Finansministeriet 1995). Decisions about care were made rather randomly and lacked a more 
systematic approach (Socialministeriet 1997). This required ‘renewal’ meeting future challenges 
of increasing demand, in both qualitative and quantitative terms (see also Andersen 1997; XXX 
2000).  
 
A related concern was the problem representation that while expenditures were expected to 
increase, public funds were seen as insufficient to match this development (Finansministeriet 
1995; Socialstyrelsen 1983). There were similar concerns in Finland: the ageing of the 
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population resulted in an increasing demand for services (Suominen and Valpola 2002: 14), 
which the municipalities had difficulties to match as it would demand raising public expenditure 
(Heikkilä et al. 1997: 3). Interestingly, the problem definition was also connected to users, who 
were ’not conscious of the costs of public services’ they received (Palveluseteli ja peruspalvelut 
1994: 30). Vouchers were seen to increase cost awareness on all sides (Palvelusetelin käyttöalan 
laajentaminen 2008: 33; see also Kuusinen-James 2012).  
 
In Denmark, the experiences with small scale marketization pilots during 1990‒1998 offered a 
springboard to further specify the qualitative challenges of the existing system of elderly care; a 
problem representation emerged around public care services as unresponsive to user needs. In 
this view, the state had heavily standardized public care services (Socialministeriet 2002; see 
also Højlund 2006). This referred to the effects of an earlier initiative introducing common 
categories for service delivery, which was seen to privilege the administrative system over the 
quality of service delivery. In the legislation on free choice, the Ministry of Social Affairs built 
on this and portrayed the existing system of elderly care as inflexible and bureaucratic, in fact 
disempowering the elderly (Socialministeriet 2002). This opened the door for the ‘freely 
choosing elderly’ who soon became the dominant figure (see also Højlund 2006).  
 
The mismatch between users and public care services was also seen as a problem in Finland. 
However, this was not only because of a lack of choice, but also because of the public sector’s 
inflexibility vis-à-vis the increasing diversity of user needs. The view was that ’[t]here is a 
general shift in the values and needs of people towards individualistic and tailored services’ 
(Hyvinvointipalvelut –kilpailua ja valinnavapautta 1995: 1). Needs were portrayed as having 
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become highly individual and this fitted poorly with the standardized service provision of the 
municipalities. 
 
Unlike in the other two countries, the Finnish documents also raised gender inequality as a 
problem, notably in two ways. One problem representation related to labour market inequalities, 
especially affecting (young) women who experienced difficulties getting into long-term 
employment. In this view, vouchers were seen as a solution, as they ’create jobs especially for 
women when new enterprises, especially small ones, are started’ (HE 74/2003: 13). Another 
problem representation related to women as the main users of vouchers, reflecting their 
longevity. Vouchers would give women a chance to influence services and to increase control 
over their lives. Since women deliver most of the informal care, vouchers would also give female 
caregivers better access to respite care (HE 74/2003: 14; see also Tillman et al. 2014).  
 
Like in Denmark and Finland, the lack of public funding of long-term care was also a major 
concern in Italy. However, here it was combined with problem representations related to the 
weakening of family care capacity. Budget constraints and the veto by specific interest groups of 
people with disabilities had earlier stopped any attempt to reform the cash-for-care payment 
which was the cornerstone of the Italian elderly care system (Costa 2013). However, in the early 
2000s, also prompted by the 2003 heat wave that killed 30,000 vulnerable elderly, providing 
adequate care to the population came to be perceived as a problem that was unlikely to be solved 
without an increase in public funding.  
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A unique Italian problem representation concerned the legalisation of the cheap workforce of 
migrant care workers, most of whom had illegally entered the country. As part of the public 
discussion surrounding the introduction of general amnesties (in 2002, 2008‒09 and 12), the 
illegal status of migrant care workers was considered a risk for Italian families; they might lose 
help if the migrant care workers were expelled from the country as ‘clandestine’: ’if badanti do 
not get their sojourn permits, Italian families go into crisis’ (CdS 15.05.2008). Similarly, within a 
decade the initial opposition of the Lega Nord Party to amnesties slowly turned into a soft 
acceptance. In 2008, the Lega Minister of the Interior declared: ’we are not going to make war to 
the people who take care of our old parents’ (CdS 04.08.2008). 
 
Within an overall restrictive immigration policy, this also required subjecting migrant care 
workers to positive discrimination by separating them from the rest of illegal migrants and by 
integrating them into the country as ‘functional workforce’. A clear distinction therefore 
emerged between the two groups; one ’who rape women or rob houses’ (CdS 18.05.2008) and 
the other ’who perform a relevant social task’ (ibid.). This representation coincided with a crucial 
change in the migratory legislation: since 2008 amnesties for undocumented migrants have been 
introduced only for care workers. 
 
Assumptions underlying the problem representations 
 
The problem representations were underpinned by a range of assumptions. In Denmark and 
Finland these related to the desirability of choice and the positive effects of competition in elder 
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care service markets; in Italy the assumptions concern the superiority of home-based care and the 
naturalness of migrant care workers as part of the elder care solution. 
 
In two Nordic countries, one of the central assumptions is that choice is desirable. For example, 
in Denmark, the basic argument was that choice by users was the lever for quality in market 
settings (Folketinget 2002; see also Petersen 2011). The elderly emerged as an active user, who 
had a range of choices: on day-to-day basis, to prioritize among specific care services, to choose 
their preferred provider and to exit if dissatisfied with the service provision. Free choice was also 
ascribed forces of empowerment; it gave the elderly greater independence and respect 
(Folketinget 2002).  
 
In Finland, the desirability of choice was framed in a more personalized way: users want choice. 
Compared to previous generations, the elderly had better skills, resources and knowledge to use 
vouchers and to make choices: ’Higher level of education and the better availability of 
information on services have increased the citizens’ ability and willingness to make their own 
choices’ (Räty et al. 2004: 1). More specifically, if users were given the choice, they preferred to 
have private service providers and with the help of vouchers users would be able to pay more for 
services. For example, the argument was that ’[v]ouchers give also the low income groups a 
chance to use private services’ (Lith 2011: 6). Correspondingly, the documents portrayed users 
as more demanding and as having more diverse needs (see also Anttonen & Häikiö 2011).  
 
The other important set of assumptions in the two Nordic countries was that competition has 
positive effects on elderly care services. In Denmark, this was based on the presumption that 
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competition created change, which was synonymous with development (Folketinget 2002; see 
also Petersen 2011). More specifically, through the mechanism of price competition, the market 
punished those (public) providers which remained unresponsive to the diverse needs of the 
elderly. Similarly, in Finland, competition was ascribed the possibility to ’increase choice and 
availability of services and make them more flexible, diverse and efficient’ (HE 20/2009: 16). 
The presence of private providers together with ’the mere existence of competition rationalizes 
the public services as well’ (Lith 2011: 14). This would force public services to change, and they 
too would become innovative, efficient and high quality. A related presupposition came from the 
Danish Ministry of Social Affairs (Folketingets Socialudvalg 2002) which stated that another 
positive effect was that competition led to a clearer division of labour between provider and 
purchaser and thus offered incentives to better attract qualified care staff. 
 
In Denmark, competition was also seen to increase fairness of needs assessment 
(Socialministeriet 1997; see also Andersen 1997) and fairness among public and private 
providers. Fairness was closely linked to another assumption, which saw care as something 
predictable. The implication was that municipalities could describe and decide upon care in 
formalized ways, which, in turn, care workers could implement in a straightforward manner (see 
also XXX 2000, 2012b). This represented an administrative logic that split up tasks to make 
them suitable for control and management. An example is a report by four ministries, which 
described the professional carer on the basis of five ‘functions for home helpers’, which were 
further split into sub-functions (Finansministeriet 1995).  
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In contrast, in Italy the assumptions related to the functioning of markets were dominated by 
migrant care workers. A primary assumption was that there were no additional public resources 
available for supporting elderly care. This ‘fact’ was used as a rationale for the extensive use of 
migrant care workers, as the following quote illustrates: ’the country would stop if they [migrant 
care workers] go on strike’ (R 01.06.2006). This also seemed to justify the irregular employment 
of care workers: ’Italians do not draft standard work contracts with migrant care workers because 
they cannot afford to pay them a regular salary’ (R 27.05.2008).  
 
Another assumption was that employing a migrant care worker was the best way to secure 
ageing in place. Care workers were explicitly welcomed as ‘savers’ of the family-based care 
system, complementing kinship networks: ’employing a care worker is a choice, which is driven 
both by sentiments and interest: the elderly should never be taken out of their own home and 
abandoned in a public residential home’ (CdS 12.08.2006). 
 
A related assumption was that the care market only functioned if the informal and domestic 
nature of migrant care work was maintained. It is emblematic that migrant care workers were 
portrayed as ‘badanti’, which is an old-fashioned term for caring people. This carried positive 
connotations in the public discourse: the badanti became recognized as ’a crucial component of 
our [Italy’s] familialistic welfare’ (R 23.05.2009), ’where people organise welfare services by 
themselves to compensate for the lack of initiative by the state’ (CdS 13.06.2004).  
 
Silences 
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In all three countries, the silences concern the conditions for and consequences of marketization. 
Like the assumptions, the specific silences reflect the two different types of care markets: in 
Denmark and Finland silences relate to specific aspects of costs and users, whereas in Italy the 
status of migrant care workers and issues of quality are silenced. In all three countries, the 
implications of markets for the everyday life of informal carers are silenced.  
 
In the Nordic countries, one set of silences related to the costs of marketization. In Denmark, one 
assumption was that free choice improved the control of monies spent on elderly care, and that 
free choice was cost neutral. Yet, this silenced the transaction costs that were associated with the 
implementation and administration of free choice. These incur in arranging, managing and 
monitoring transactions across the markets (Williamson 1975). 
 
In Finland, silences around costs are more directly related to users. The view was that users were 
ignorant of the actual costs of elderly care services and instead economized and turned to public 
services, even when they could afford to purchase services from the market. This silenced the 
costs of voucher system to the users and the actual ability of users to pay services. There was 
also no consideration of how it was possible that private providers could offer services for less 
than public providers and still make a profit. Questions such as, where does the profit come from 
and where does it go, were never posed. 
 
A second set of silences in Denmark and Finland concerned the characteristics of users in care 
markets. In the former, the focus was on the type of choices that existed, rather than on the 
conditions for realizing the choice available in principle. The assumption is that elderly people 
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had the relevant information and the necessary resources to make informed choices. But what 
specific information and what specific resources were required for elderly people to be able to 
choose and to change providers? Further, how did ‘free choice’ work out in practice? What were 
the specific implications for the day-to-day experiences of receiving care, on the part of the 
elderly person, and of giving care, on the part of the care worker? What are the consequences for 
informal carers?  
 
Similarly, in Finland there was a widespread understanding of users as more demanding and as 
having more diversified needs (see also Anttonen and Häikiö 2011). Yet, in the policy 
documents there was no discussion of what users were like in reality. It is well known that more 
elders suffer from memory disorders (Vuorio and Väyrynen 2011) and that users of elder care 
services are also older and frailer than before (Kaskisaari et al. 2010). However, it was unlikely 
that this would make users more conscious and active clients demanding more choice.  
 
A third set of silences related to the issue of employment and in Finland, vouchers were assumed 
to enhance the creation of female-led small enterprises. There was no information on whether the 
low-paid care workers actually wanted to start their own companies and to take the risks of 
entrepreneurial activity. How did the working environment, income and benefits of these women 
change? How did they acquire the skills needed for running a business? Was a small home care 
company sufficient to make a living? Instead, the issue of employment was considered only from 
the point of view of the municipalities.  
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Meanwhile in Italy there was a silence around the working conditions of migrant care workers. 
One silence concerned their human and labour rights, as well as their living conditions. In more 
than a decade, the major national newspapers had not published any articles about the material 
difficulties faced by these workers. Instead, any specific requests by migrant care workers were 
discredited; for example a request for family reunification was portrayed as an ‘an insidious 
invasion’ (R. 18.05.2008). It was therefore accepted that migrant care workers faced typical 
secondary labour market working conditions: very low salaries, considerable insecurity, mix of 
formal and informal arrangements, no upward mobility. One justification was the transient status 
of migrant care workers: ’they [migrant care workers] do not need social contributions as their 
migratory plan is only temporary’ (R. 25.10.2011).  
 
The cash-based nature of the Italian long-term care system was also never challenged (Costa 
2013): ’Italian families were left alone by the state and they found a private solution on the 
market’ (R. 24.06.2006). The growth of the care market was seen as evidence of the inadequacy 
of public policies, but there were no calls for change. Instead, the lack of higher public subsidies 
was claimed to be responsible for the growth of the illegal market: ’the indennità di 
accompagnamento does not provide enough money to pay the salary of migrant care workers if 
they have to be regularly employed; it [the cash benefit] just covers food, housing costs, and 
bills’ (R. 02.02.2010).The quality of care that elderly people received from migrant care workers 
was also never discussed. Finally, the predominant focus on migrant care workers silenced the 
contribution of informal carers and their day-to-day lives. 
 
Discussion  
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Marketization is widespread across elderly care systems in Europe and includes a variety of 
supply and demand led mechanisms. In the international literature on marketization, the 
institutional perspective is dominant and studies examine the politics and policies of 
marketization. Instead, our analysis has reconstructed how social and political actors have argued 
in favour of/legitimised this turn in social policy. We focus on the ideas underlying 
marketization and this is important for two reasons. Like other social policies, elderly care is a 
policy field where normative assumptions play an important role, and there are a number of 
countries where marketization occurred without radical institutional change. Using Bacchi’s 
‘What’s the problem’ approach, we analyse the discursive processes of constructing and 
legitimising markets in elderly care based on a comparative analysis of demand led 
marketization mechanisms in Denmark, Finland and Italy. The analysis mainly draws on official 
and other relevant policy documents as well as on newspaper articles. 
 
Empirically, the analysis offers interesting insights into the construction and legitimisation of 
markets at the level of discourse; this occurs by defining specific problem representations, 
underlying assumptions and silences. On the part of policy makers, there is a demand for 
arguments that represent a good match between marketization and defined problems in the 
existing system of elderly care, while other arguments are silenced or pushed aside. This occurs 
through either discontinuities or continuities. In Denmark and Finland, the old-fashioned, costly 
and bureaucratic public system is the main problem representation and this is contrasted with 
markets as modern, efficient, responsive and cost-saving. In contrast, in Italy, the lack of public 
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funding together with the declining caring capacity of families emerged as the central problem 
representation. An informal, flexible market is portrayed as the natural extension of the existing 
family-based system although under new circumstances; it is based on relationships of 
paternalistic dominance between employer-families and an extensive, cheap labour force with no 
social rights.  
 
Processes directed at defining the underlying assumptions further support the 
discontinuities/continuities connecting marketization with existing systems of elderly care in our 
three countries. These relate to the superior functioning of markets as responsive and efficient, 
and as offering more choice for users and value for money. However, the views on the role of 
public actors vary. In Denmark and Finland markets are to be controlled and regulated, whereas 
in Italy markets are perceived as natural and spontaneous, needing to be safeguarded through 
flexible regulation. This allows not only for the unregulated informal market of care to exist, but 
also for its illegality to be ignored.  
 
Defining problem representations and assumptions rests on processes of silencing. In all three 
countries, one major silence relates to the consequences of markets for care workers. This 
concerns the following: migrant care workers in Italy and their unregulated and unsafe working 
conditions as well as their lack of social rights, the female entrepreneurs in the Finnish care 
market and the Danish care workers who work under strict managerial control. The everyday 
experiences of users of care services are also silenced. This includes the quality of care received 
from low paid migrant care workers in Italy as well as the willingness and abilities of Danish and 
Finnish elders to make choices in the care market. Finally, the issue of informal carers is not at 
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all discussed in Denmark and Italy, while in Finland informal carers are portrayed as potentially 
empowered and gendered users of vouchers. Yet, neither in Finland the consequences of markets 
for the everyday life of informal carers are discussed.  
 
The variety of ways to construct and legitimate markets through problem representations, 
underlying assumptions and associated silences also makes an important conceptual point. In 
addition to its institutions, it is crucial to understand the ideas behind the marketization of elderly 
care. Ideas are a key leverage for making policies and practices of marketization acceptable and 
decision makers and other influential political/societal actors use ideas in policy and public 
debates (Béland 2005). The different ideas about what a care market is and should be crystallize 
in the particular institutional forms of care markets which become dominant in individual 
national contexts. In Denmark and Finland care markets have been highly regulated in order to 
secure the high level of efficiency and responsiveness they are supposed to have. In Italy the idea 
of introducing a care ‘market’ has been, more or less explicitly, almost ignored and consequently 
the use of migrant care workers has been left almost unregulated and embedded in paternalistic 
relationships.  
 
However, ideas do not always relate to the institutions of the elderly care system in a linear way 
(see also Béland 2005); the differences between Denmark and Finland are a case in point. For 
example, although both countries have a strong focus on gender equality, this is only an issue in 
Finnish public discourses. The gendered nature of informal care giving and the gender biases in 
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labour market participation form part of the problem representation, while women’s interests in 
becoming care entrepreneurs is one of the silences. 
 
Further, in methodological terms, the analysis highlights the advantages of adopting a cross-
country comparative perspective when using the ‘What’s the problem’ approach. XXX (2012a) 
stresses the merits of the comparative perspective, specifically when analysing policy silences. 
Juxtaposing seemingly similar discourses in different contexts helps ‘de-naturalising’ individual 
discourses and identifying what is not talked about. The present analysis included two sets of 
cases with variation of contexts and as such powerfully demonstrates that the merits of 
comparison extend to the other dimensions of the approach. The cross-country comparative 
approach makes studies based on the ‘What’s the problem’ approach more robust.  
 
In summary, our analysis of how markets in elderly care are constructed, legitimated and framed 
as a viable solution to the perceived problems of the existing system of elderly care shows that 
ideas around financial savings and/or the overall superiority of marketization of elder care 
services dominate. The literature suggests that marketization significantly changes existing 
systems of elderly care, ranging from gains in service efficiency and effectiveness (Le Grand 
1991) to the rise of inequality and re-familiarisation (Lewis 1998). However, at the level of 
public discourse, marketization is presented as a solution which builds on rather than challenges 
dominant ideas of care. In Denmark and Finland, market mechanisms are supposed to improve 
the functioning of the public system in elderly care, whereas in Italy market mechanisms are seen 
as a way to preserve the family ties through the use of badanti. Nevertheless, as the silences in 
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the public discourse show, dominant ideas about what a market is and how it works are very 
narrow and minimal across all our countries; there is little concern about its implications for 
service quality, working conditions and society more broadly. Importantly, this bears the risk of 
constructing markets that are alien to care users/workers/informal carers and whose legitimacy is 
not sustainable in the long-run. In the future, better knowledge of the role played by ideas in 
forging care policies, and specifically the introduction of market mechanisms, will allow a more 
critical understanding not only of how marketization is generally accepted as a solution, but also 
of the issues which marketization silences.  
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